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EXPLANATION AND JUSTIFICATION

(Note: Bracketed portions only are classified.)

1. Purpose of Proposed Bill

a. The proposed bill permits the Agency to improve its retirement program by authorizing the establishment of a retirement system corresponding to that of the Foreign Service. The Central Intelligence Agency needs to attract and retain a force of highly motivated careerists who are intensively trained in unique skills. However, the Agency is unable in fact to provide full-term careers for many individual officers. In order to minimize the adverse effects of necessary programs of managed attrition and to preserve its ability to recruit and retain the high caliber personnel it needs, the Agency must make reasonable provision for the future of those individuals who must be separated before completing a full-term career of thirty or so years. Therefore, Section 3 of the proposed bill adds a new paragraph (g) to Section 5 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, authorizing the Director of Central Intelligence to exercise the authority available to the Secretary of State under the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, in order to establish a retirement and disability system corresponding to that available to Foreign Service Officers for a limited number of Agency employees.

b. Since all provisions pertaining to the retirement of Foreign Service Officers are not contained in a single Title of the Foreign Service Act and since it is possible that future amendments relating to retirement may occur elsewhere than in Title VIII, which is entitled "The Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System," it is necessary to make general provision for the Director of Central Intelligence to adopt provisions of law applicable to Foreign Service Officers for Agency employees. Additionally, most of the basic travel allowances and overseas benefits available to Foreign Service personnel are authorized for Agency employees by existing Section 4 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended. However, amendments to the Foreign Service Act over the years have of necessity required the Agency to seek legislation periodically in order to keep such authorities up to date and uniform with those available to Foreign Service personnel. Consequently, it is now proposed that the existing Section 4 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act be rescinded by Section 2 of the proposed bill. In lieu of the rescinded authorities, the new Section 4 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act authorizes the Director to adopt and apply to Agency employees provisions of law applicable to Foreign Service personnel and to exercise with respect to Agency employees the authority available to the Secretary of State for the purpose of having Agency employees accorded appropriate benefits, rights, and allowances now authorized for Foreign Service Officers.

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2. Problem

All regular employees of the Central Intelligence Agency are at present covered by the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act. Such coverage is appropriate for those whose conditions, obligations, and terms of service are comparable to those of federal employees generally. However, the Agency has a serious problem in its need to make more adequate provision for certain of its employees who should be retired at an earlier age and with a more equitable annuity than can be provided under the Civil Service Retirement Act. This need stems from the fact that the Agency cannot provide to or expect from many individuals in its service a full-term working career of thirty or so years.

3. Background

a. The conditions underlying this situation are complex. For some years, the Agency has recognized that it faces a serious dilemma. On the one hand, the nature of its mission requires the employment of people who are highly motivated and who develop unique and specialized abilities through their continuing training and service over the years. Moreover, the nature of the Agency's mission requires that a substantial proportion of its personnel accept, as do members of the military services and the Foreign Service, the obligation to serve anywhere in the world at the Agency's direction---not at their own will---and to be available for duty on a 24-hour-a-day basis. In sum, the employment of people to serve on a career basis is essential to fill the majority of the Agency's requirements for personnel. On the other hand, factors directly related to the nature and conditions of service in the intelligence field and factors affecting the ability and desire of individuals to remain in such work on a long-term basis make it infeasible to provide full-term employment for all careerists.

b. The nature of the work involved in the Agency's operations requires people who have a high degree of vigor, vitality, endurance, resilience, and adaptability. Such traits are required to cope with the stresses and strains occasioned by uneven and uncertain hours and days of work, duty in unhealthy locations with less than adequate medical facilities, or arduous, and not infrequently hazardous, assignments. [For example, the responsibility of the Agency for covert cold war functions and continuance of counter-insurgency activities requires the Agency to employ numbers of individuals whose skills are not necessarily adaptable to full-term careers.]

c. [There is a further requirement that officers serving overseas must normally perform their work under the cover of employment with some other organization, a requirement which limits their long-term utility. The usefulness of an officer is seriously impaired if not destroyed if his true employment affiliation is revealed. However, the longer he serves under cover, and particularly if his cover must be changed in the course of moves from one post to another, the greater becomes the risk that his true affiliation will be inadvertently revealed to or inferred by hostile parties.]

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Finally, since most positions in cover organizations which can be made available for the Agency's use are those which would normally be manned by junior personnel of the host organization, it is difficult to find appropriate cover for any substantial number of officers of middle-age or over.

d. There are other factors pertaining to the individuals themselves which, over the years, limit their ability and desire to continue in overseas service. First, there is "motivational exhaustion." This term is used to describe a gradual lessening of interest and enthusiasm of an officer as a result of impingements on his personal and family life. These stem from the transient nature of his assignments, the complications and restrictions of security requirements, and intrusions on his family life [occasioned by the requirement that he spend his apparent "leisure time" in performing additional Agency duties after completing his cover workday]. Further, while all Agency employees are subject to security restrictions which place severe limitations on their personal freedoms, employees serving abroad are subject to even greater restrictions [and, in addition, must conduct their personal affairs in a manner consistent with their cover employment]. These factors tend to lessen the enthusiasm and willingness of the family to accompany the officer on further assignments overseas. Lastly, our experience has shown that many employees or members of their families will in time incur physical impediments which limit or preclude further assignment overseas.

e. The dynamic nature of intelligence produces sudden and sometimes radical shifts in the types of personnel required. Completion of a mission of a temporary nature or a shift in emphasis or direction of operations may result in an overabundance of officers who are skilled in a relatively narrow field. Their primary qualifications thus become obsolete or unneeded and they become "occupationally surplus."

4. Manpower Control

a. The Agency finds it increasingly necessary to impose manpower controls to ensure appropriate alignment as to age, qualifications, and other characteristics of its employees [engaged in conducting or supporting foreign intelligence operations]. Insofar as possible, imbalances should be and are corrected by the reassignment of officers who cannot or should not continue in such work to other fields of work in the Agency. It is a certainty, nonetheless, that encouraged and induced attrition will be necessary. A program of managed attrition, however, is feasible only if it is linked with a system of retirement benefits which are sufficient to induce an employee or a prospective employee to take the risk that he may be one of those individuals who cannot serve a full-term career.

b. The seriousness of this risk to the individual is greatly augmented by the difficulty which he will encounter in effecting a transfer from intelligence activities to other government or commercial fields. The principal reason for this is that the special skills required for intelligence work are not ordinarily required in other fields. Other reasons are the inability of employees for security reasons to describe or confirm to a prospective

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employer the scope and level of his duties and responsibilities. [Further, there is a reluctance on the part of other employers, both government and private, who are engaged in business overseas to hire a former intelligence officer. This reluctance stems from their concern that the attitudes of foreign officials toward their enterprises might be adversely affected if they were known to employ "former spies."]

c. As part of its manpower control program, the Agency has instituted administrative procedures for identifying employees who become surplus to its needs because of the several factors described above and has recently engaged in an exercise which will result in the separation of approximately 150 such individuals. This process was made the more painful because of the relatively inadequate assistance which the Agency could offer those separated in making occupational transfers or in retiring prematurely. The benefits available were limited to those provided under the discontinued service provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act and to modest separation compensation payments from the Agency which are related to years of service and salary.

5. Proposed Retirement System

a. In order to minimize the adverse effects of such programs on the Agency's ability to recruit and retain the caliber of personnel needed, and particularly to minimize their effects on the dedicated personnel already in the service of the Agency, better provision must be made for the futures of those individuals who are separated before completing a full-term career. An important means for doing so is to establish a retirement system permitting earlier retirement with a more nearly adequate and equitable annuity than is possible under the civil service retirement system. The Foreign Service system is more suitable for those Agency employees whose careers have involved comparable conditions of service. Appendix A compares the pertinent provisions of the Foreign Service and the civil service retirement systems. This chart is based on a similar chart appearing in the Report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in the 2nd session of the 86th Congress. It was prepared at that time in connection with proposed amendments to the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, relating to the retirement system which proposals were subsequently enacted into law.

b. Aside from the additional special requirements applicable to Agency employment, employees who serve overseas are subject to essentially the same conditions of service which were the basis for the development of the Foreign Service retirement system. By adopting a system corresponding to the Foreign Service system, the Agency can take advantage of the considerable study and experience which have gone into its development. 25X1C

c. Such a retirement system would not be appropriate for all Agency employees and it is not the Agency's intention in requesting authority to

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establish such a system to apply it to all. The employees who are to be designated for coverage under this system will undergo a rigid selection process. [The essential criteria for coverage under the proposed retirement system would be as follows:]

[(1) Career employees whose duties and responsibilities are predominantly concerned with the conduct and support of intelligence operations in foreign countries or with covert support in the United States of such operations under comparable conditions.]

[(2) Career employees whose duties are so specialized that they are placed at a special disadvantage when required to seek other employment.]

6. Estimated Number of Employees under Proposed System

25X9

a. [The careers [] employees are directly oriented to intelligence operations abroad. At any moment in time, approximately [] are serving abroad while the balance are at headquarters as replacements.] 25X9
It is estimated that a maximum of [] employees will qualify for coverage 25X9 under the new system; civil service retirement will remain the retirement system for all other employees.

b. [Normally, we would anticipate that an average of about 27 of these employees would become eligible for optional retirement under the civil service retirement system during each of the next five years. For the reasons presented in justification of our need for a retirement system comparable to that of the Foreign Service, and to correct imbalances in the age make-up of this group, we would hope, under the new system, to increase the average number of retirements from this group by about 40 in each of these years.] During the past year the average age of Agency personnel who retired under the Civil Service Retirement System was 66. We hope, in time, to lower the average retirement age of those under the new retirement system to about 55 years which is comparable to the average retirement age in the Foreign Service.

7. Cost Estimates

a. There will be certain increased costs for the administration of the retirement system. For reasons of efficiency and security, it is considered essential that full administration of the program excluding maintenance of the fund by the Department of the Treasury (as required by law in the case of the Foreign Service Retirement Fund) be accomplished within the Agency. It is estimated that by the end of the first five years the administration of the proposed program would cost approximately \$80,000 per year with an increase of approximately eight man years. Internal administration of the program would include determinations of eligibility and entitlements, payment of retirement benefits, and all related administrative matters.

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b. Program costs cannot be estimated with comparable precision. Nevertheless, reasonably valid estimates have been made on the basis of actuarial experience of the civil service and Foreign Service systems. Based on the cost differential of the differing benefits of the two programs and applying it to the estimated maximum of 4,500 eligible for the proposed retirement system, we compute that a maximum additional Government contribution of \$4.6 million annually would be required. However, it has not been government practice for many years to fully fund its retirement programs. Further, there have been special charges against the Foreign Service Retirement Fund which go beyond the basic benefits of the proposed CIA system.

[c. A more realistic estimate can be made of the increased payout in basic annuity benefits under the proposed system over the civil service retirement system for the next five fiscal years. The estimate assumes a target rate of 67 retirements per year. Other assumptions, based upon manpower studies and age and grade characteristics of the eligible group, contemplate an average retirement age of 55 years with 25 years of service and an average high-five salary of \$11,000 (about the second step of grade GS-13). Basic annuities computed under the new system would be \$5,500 as against \$4,829 under the civil service system. The difference of \$671 applied to the estimated average of 67 retirements per year would result in the following total increased annuity payments for the years shown:

<u>FY Year</u>	<u>Annuityants</u> (Cumulative Totals)	<u>Increased</u> <u>Annuity Payments</u> (Cumulative Totals)
1963(one-half year)	34	\$ 22,814
1964	101	67,771
1965	168	112,728
1966	235	157,685
1967	302	202,642
	Total	\$ 563,640

The chain of recruitment, reassignment, and promotion actions created by this annual retirement of officers would result in a considerable lapse in salary expenses. Assuming an average lag of six months in this process, the reduction of expenditures would approximate \$2,300 per retirement and would total approximately \$414,000 over a five-year period. This amount would almost offset the estimated increase in annuity payments for the first five years that the new system was in operation.]

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